Yangtze Showdown Read online

  The operation to get the oil on board began at 0500 and was completed at 1600, with everyone ‘working like hell’. Coxswain Leslie Frank was impressed: ‘The impossible has been done, what an achievement, a feat that I should think is without parallel in the history of our glorious navy. What makes this all the more praiseworthy is the fact that not only have the ship’s company had no exercise for 82 days but everything used in this operation had to be improvised.’ 3

  All three of the fuel connections were on the port side and the ship developed a heavy list until steam could be raised and the fuel pumped over. The ship levelled off. ‘The embarkation of this fuel was a great stimulant and came as a much needed tonic,’ Kerans noted. Amethyst now had 116 tons of fuel. There was a setback that day, however. The last valve on the wireless transmitter went, which meant that power had to be used to send messages. Later Kerans would comment: ‘The outstanding success perhaps of all our time in the river was the receipt of 54 tons of Admiralty oil fuel. I shall never know why the Communist authorities were so ready to accede to the entry of this invaluable oil fuel … This was the one mistake of Colonel Kang – for a long time he thought we burned coal!’4

  The month of July had begun with some promise. The assistant naval attaché in Shanghai arranged to send an interpreter called Khoong with medicine, mosquito netting, Communist currency – and charts of the lower Yangtze. The persistent Khoong arrived in Chingkiang after a difficult rail journey and threats of arrest on two occasions. He handed over the supplies to Leo but the charts were confiscated because they were deemed secret and issued by the ‘reactionary’ Nationalist government, even though they had been bought in a shop in Shanghai and Khoong could produce the receipt. Kang no doubt thought that Amethyst could not get down the Yangtze without the charts, and Kerans, looking on the positive side, realised that the decision gave him some cover. As Coxswain Frank would point out: ‘Little do they know that we can go down without them.’

  With the fighting over in the areas surrounding the Yangtze, more and more ships were using the river, day and night. In the early hours of 2 July, the darkened Amethyst was almost rammed by two large merchant ships. The vessels moving at night were carrying military supplies for the Communists, and the frigate had not been showing any lights because of the danger of Nationalist air attacks. The following night another ship narrowly avoided hitting Amethyst. ‘This is getting rather too much,’ Frank recorded. ‘Our nerves are not in a condition to stand many shocks like that these days.’ Kerans decided the ship should display anchor and stern lights. He also asked the assistant naval attaché in Shanghai to warn shipping companies of Amethyst’s presence, although by this time she was almost ‘a landmark’.

  The interpreter Leo was trying to find out from the local garrison commander when talks would resume and learned that the wording of the agreement might be a lengthy process. Kerans sent a letter to Kang, saying the unnecessary delays were not understood, and were causing continued hardship to the crew. ‘I always stressed the latter point whenever I could as it was always a sore point with the Communists,’ Kerans reported. ‘This was a depressing period and personally my spirits were low as I did not see what I could do next to hasten matters – and time was so vital. This was the longest wait [22 June to 5 July] between meetings and the period of activity was beginning to tell on us all.’

  Without warning on 5 July Kerans was called to a meeting with Kang at the village opposite the ship. There was a ‘distinct hardening’ of attitude, with the Communists objecting to the wording of Admiral Brind’s suggested agreement. They wanted a key paragraph to read: ‘I recognise that HMS Amethyst and the other three British warships involved in the incident infringed into China’s national river and the PLA frontier zone, without the permission of the PLA being a basic fault on the part of the British side.’ Kang had originally wanted to use ‘invasion’ [invaded] instead of ‘infringed’ and ‘fundamental guilt’ instead of ‘basic fault’. Kerans pointed out that the new wording was different from the agreement that General Yuan had in mind on 22 June. But he became optimistic when the question of safe conduct was brought up, with the offer of a pilot and a promise that all batteries would be warned. Amethyst might be able to sail in a week’s time. ‘This was, of course, all part of Kang’s tactics to wear me down and build up false hopes,’ Kerans noted. ‘It was not apparent to me at the time.’

  Kerans had been trying to get the diplomat Edward Youde involved in the talks. It was Youde, fluent in Mandarin, who had made the determined attempt to contact the Communist authorities soon after the attack on Amethyst. Kang blocked the diplomat’s permit to leave Nanking but told Leo several days later that he was willing to have him involved in negotiations.

  Kerans tried hard to persuade the colonel to return the charts brought from Shanghai but met only indifference. ‘Regrettably I nearly lost my temper, I was so exasperated at this unreasonable attitude,’ he admitted. ‘I needed Youde’s help badly, since Leo’s advice and knowledge, good enough though it was, was insufficient when it came to technicalities over wording.’ The agreement would be in Chinese and Kerans was worried in case ‘infringed’ became ‘invaded’ because the characters might be similar. He was unhappy about the wording anyway but decided it was the best he could do after an hour’s discussion.5

  Brind was informed of the outcome of the meeting and sent a message saying the proposed wording was ‘quite unacceptable’. There was a sharply-worded telegram to Ambassador Stevenson from the Foreign Office, probably on the direction of the foreign secretary: ‘I cannot accept any phraseology which involves our conceding that we were in the wrong. On whatever level it may be conducted the fact remains that this is the first important negotiation we are having with the Communists. If we show willingness to make concessions which jeopardise our whole position in the matter even before actual negotiations begin, the Communists will score such a triumph (which will no doubt be widely publicised) that we may never recover from this initial step.’ Britain might end up taking the matter to the United Nations, but in the meantime, to secure Amethyst’s release, Brind had permission to admit that the frigate entered the frontier zone ‘without the concurrence’ of the PLA and it caused ‘a misunderstanding’.6

  A senior member of Brind’s staff produced a lengthy assessment of Amethyst and her situation. Living conditions on board were ‘fairly grim’. Meat would run out before the end of July and all basic foods by early August, although the ship was still getting supplies from local traders. Power was being shut down for long spells, with only emergency lighting and no ventilation. Amethyst remained badly damaged but she could still sail down the river, which was high. Surprisingly, the report made damning comments about Kerans and the ship’s company.

  On the crew, the assessment pointed out:

  There is very little to show what the men are feeling like. The tunes they chose for the special broadcast showed they still had a sense of humour left on 23 June. She had not a reputation of a good ship before the incident and was very dirty. It has been suggested that the crew might be mutinous, especially as regards drastic action is concerned such as making a night escape. I doubt whether this is so; after all the ship is closed down for 54 hours at a time [Kerans originally decided on 59 hours] and the crew is thus denied every form of normal amenity. However, they may be submitting to this in order to avoid falling into the hands of the Communists and the possibility must be borne in mind.

  On Kerans, the report said:

  He led a roving life in the past, moving from job to job and tending to leave in a hurry. On one occasion he found himself in trouble for not controlling his men properly on Christmas Day. He is also reputed to be fond of the bottle but there is no need to exaggerate this. He has had experience of ‘I’ work and interrogation and is supposed to be good at negotiating. No great personality according to those who have met him.

  Kerans lately has been showing signs in his signals of being under considerable strain. His emot
ions are obviously very near the surface and he flies from elation to depression very easily. His responsibility weighs heavily on him and this is not surprising as he must be aware that he is the focus of public attention. He is living in very poor conditions and he may well not be sure of the morale of his crew.

  He may or may not have been worked on by his opponents but the effect on him seems to be the same whichever is true. There have been moments when he has been encouraged by statements or events to believe that the end was near – but these have all been shattered soon afterwards leaving him in what can only be described as a pitiful state.

  The cumulative effect of all this … seems to have left him with nothing but the strongest desire to end it all at any cost with the greatest possible speed. The Communists to him represent something very powerful against which he regards himself as impotent – the only thing to do is to appease them. He no longer seems to believe in the efficacy of taking a firm line.

  It was thought unlikely that the Communists wanted to seize Amethyst. Their probable aim was to ‘humiliate the British’, showing that they could defy foreigners and get away with it. The report recommended that Kerans should be relieved of his command if he did not take a tougher stand.7

  Brind and his staff were not the only ones with doubts about Kerans and his tactics. ‘By the beginning of July some of us were wondering whether we were ever going to get anywhere with negotiations,’ said Lieutenant Hett.

  The only solution might be to break out. This is something I did not much discuss with Commander Kerans. Obviously he was the man doing the negotiations and he was the chap who would have to take a decision if we were going to break out. Lieutenant Strain and a few others did talk about this, and we began to start saying this to Commander Kerans but he didn’t take these suggestions very sympathetically. He may well have agreed with what we were saying but he didn’t give us any support. I suspect he didn’t want the feeling going around the ship that sooner or later we were going to have to break out.8

  Perhaps Brind and his staff had underestimated the resolve of Kerans and his crew. At about this time the captain announced that the ship would have to go on half rations. The men accepted it. According to Coxswain Frank, they were still backing him all the way: ‘It looks as if the captain thinks that they [the Communists] are going to try to starve us in to giving in and using the wording they want. But then again Kang does not know the British sailor, and whatever the captain decides he can rest assured that we are all with him, and we shall not let him down.’9

  On 10 July there was a significant disclosure. Vice Admiral Madden sent a signal to the commander-in-chief saying that Lieutenant Berger, who was seriously wounded in the attack on Amethyst, had told him the frigate tested her firing circuits shortly before the Communists opened fire. Berger was certain the main guns were trained fore and aft, but the weather was calm and still, and it was likely that the batteries heard the noise and saw the smoke. ‘The possibility that in the keyed up state they mistook this for firing cannot be ruled out,’ Madden reported. ‘It is also possible that the battery commander’s firm assertion in the early discussions that they did not fire first may have been founded on this.’ The question of who fired first was no longer being pursued by the Communists in talks but, Madden pointed out, it might be raised again later on.

  Earlier, Madden had officially recorded that he took ‘sole and entire responsibility’ for the decision to send Amethyst up the Yangtze. ‘I judged that the need to fulfil the Nanking commitment justified the risk as I saw it; I did not foresee what turned out to be a determined and sustained attack on the ship. The subsequent loss of life in and damage to HM Ships, which I most deeply regret, was therefore due to my error in underestimating the risk involved.’10

  Another meeting took place in Chingkiang on 11 July, and it was obvious to Kerans that Kang had been reading the plain-language signals between Amethyst and Brind. The admiral had sent a revised agreement, which Kerans thought went a long way to meet the Communist demands. Brind acknowledged that Amethyst’s entry into the frontier zone without the ‘concurrence’ of the PLA caused a misunderstanding. If the agreement was acceptable to the Communists, Kerans had permission to sign it. The meeting did not start well. For some 40 minutes Kerans was forced to listen to a tirade of abuse, including complaints about minor typing errors, which were deemed an insult to the PLA. Eventually he managed to steer the talks back to the point that General Yuan’s proposal of 22 June differed significantly from Kang’s demands on 5 July. Kerans asked to see the general but was told that he would first have to make an application in writing and, in any case, Kang was authorised to carry on the negotiations. All the previous arguments were reiterated before Kerans was able to present Brind’s ‘final’ proposed agreement. There would be no concessions beyond keeping to the truth. The talks went on for three hours before Kang rejected the admiral’s solution and insisted there could not be a separate guarantee of safe conduct, despite the general’s earlier assurance. Amethyst would have to stay.

  Clearance for a merchant ship to bring supplies from Hong Kong was again refused on the grounds that it would be an attempt to ‘invade’, despite the obvious fact that the Yangtze was open to shipping. Kang also refused to allow Youde to participate in negotiations. ‘This was probably the worst meeting I endured, in which a virtual ultimatum had been delivered to accede to their demands and every effort was being made to ensure our isolation and increase the severity of living conditions on board,’ Kerans reported. ‘The fact that I was unable to see the general was clear that Kang was playing his own game … Deadlock was reached and when Kang realised I was not going to give in to his wishes the meeting broke up.’11

  17

  Thoughts of Escape

  LIEUTENANT HETT’S HINTS THAT THE only avenue remaining was an escape attempt had not registered with Kerans, or so it appeared. However, the possibility of escape seems to have been on the captain’s mind for some time. After the failure of the meeting on 11 July Amethyst’s dire position was once again put into sharp focus. Negotiations could get worse and stores, food and especially fuel, were continuing to dwindle. On the other hand, if Kerans broke off talks, there could be repercussions for the British communities in China. And a breakout might lead to loss of life. How acceptable would that be?

  Kerans thought the best chance of escape would be before or after a typhoon, with heavy rainfall providing cover. The weather should silence the batteries but there would be enough visibility for the ship to see the banks, although without radar the risk was high. Since the earliest days, after destroying secret equipment and code books, Amethyst was hampered by the fact that she did not have a secure means of communication with the Far East Station. Kerans needed guidance and he sent a plain-language signal to Admiral Brind: ‘Grateful your advice on my actions if menaced by a typhoon. Have informed general on several occasions of this possible danger in order to hasten matters.’ There were some on the admiral’s staff who saw no hidden meaning, but Brind realised it was an opportunity to give permission to escape and sent the reply: ‘Typhoons are unlikely to reach you in serious strength and you are in good holding ground, the golden rule of making an offing and taking plenty of sea room applies particularly.’

  Kerans concluded, however, that the admiral was not giving his permission, and admitted later he had made ‘a grave error of judgement’. Hett ‘and others’ realised straight away that Brind wanted him to try to escape. The advice to get sea room was too strong a hint. A few days later Brind’s second-in-command, Vice Admiral Madden, sent a signal that added to the confusion: ‘Presumably her [Amethyst’s] anchor is now deeply embedded by silt and unlikely to drag. Best action therefore to veer as much cable as possible using second anchor either to control yaw or back up first anchor. I should be able to give Amethyst ample warning of approach of typhoon.’ Kerans decided that this was confirmation that he should stay and try to negotiate his way out.1

  It is perhaps no
t surprising that Kerans ended up being confused. For a long time Brind had resisted suggestions that there should be an escape attempt. Commander Peter Dickens became the admiral’s staff officer operations in the May. When Amethyst was attacked he had been digging early potatoes on the family farm in Wiltshire. He remarked to his father, Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens: ‘She’ll have to make a run for it – there’s no other way out.’

  Brind’s flag lieutenant, David Scott, recounted:

  Peter never deviated from this view, and as soon as he felt himself settled in his new appointment he voiced his opinion to Admiral Brind. At that time the C-in-C still believed he would be able to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, and he gave Peter a decisively negative response, leaving no room for discussion. Peter nevertheless continued to take every opportunity to repeat his conviction, hoping that it would eventually take root in the mind of the C-in-C. The Chinese negotiators played into his hands. Exasperation and frustration caused by their attitude began to change the mind of the C-in-C. Finally, it was the receipt of a signal from Kerans asking for advice as to the action he should take if engulfed by an approaching typhoon which caused Admiral Brind to believe that an attempted break-out by Amethyst, even if it resulted in heavy casualties and the loss of the ship, was the best course of action for the Royal Navy and the country. He tried his thoughts out on his staff officer operations very late one evening while at sea in HMS Alert. Needless to say, Peter was delighted. For the C-in-C to determine on such a course of action was a most remarkable display of moral courage, for Whitehall policy was that further casualties were quite unacceptable.2