Yangtze Showdown Read online

  We consider that the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist government is not such that, even if the Communists control the whole of China, it could be classed as a major power. We therefore consider that Hong Kong could be held, unless we are engaged in a war with Russia. Hong Kong, like Berlin, may well become the stage for a trial of strength between Communism and the western powers. If the Chinese Communist government were able to force our withdrawal from the colony, the blow to our prestige throughout the world would be irreparable and there would be serious repercussions on the efforts now being made against Communism in the Far East.10

  By 28 May the stakes were still being increased. Britain decided to send two further infantry brigades, a fighter squadron, and two carriers and four destroyers or frigates. Significantly, Commonwealth governments and the United States were being asked whether they would support publicly the policy of defending Hong Kong against Communist aggression.11

  An intelligence assessment on 2 June concluded that the return of Hong Kong to China was an important piece of Communist policy but that ‘they will do their best to achieve this without recourse to open attack’. The colony was too useful as a trading centre and a base for subversion. If the Communists decided on a direct attack, it was estimated they would not be able to launch one until late September. Such an assault would probably be delivered by one or two armies, each organised into three divisions of approximately 10,000 men, supported by up to 400 artillery pieces and 100 light tanks, and with three similar armies in reserve. The assessment added: ‘The threats to Hong Kong by means short of full-scale attack may well continue for many months. We consider that the Communists would have no difficulty in maintaining a serious military threat over a long period.’12

  15

  Deadlock

  THE MORALE OF AMETHYST’S CREW remained high despite the many problems. ‘All on board were determined to hold out for the truth and were willing to accept the difficult circumstances with cheerful spirit and come what may,’ Kerans recorded. On 3 June he was called abruptly to another meeting with Colonel Kang, who used ‘every subtle device’ to get the captain to assume overall responsibility for negotiations. Kerans refused, and Kang made it clear that he did not want to deal with a senior officer. The colonel referred to the ‘invasion’ of Chinese sovereignty and gave ‘illogical’ answers, but he did agree that the interpreter Sam Leo could go to Nanking to obtain Communist currency. Kerans would take this opportunity to send a letter to Ambassador Stevenson, stating that he had said nothing to embarrass the British government and he doubted if any other officer ‘could better the arguments I had already used’. He also gave a date in July when the ship would not have enough fuel to sail down river.1

  Admiral Brind was getting frustrated, telling his wife Edie in a letter written on board London: ‘I wish to goodness I could get on with the Amethyst business. There seems to be an absolute deadlock at the moment and it is difficult sometimes to insist on doing what would have been best, for if it fails the government becomes “embarrassed”.’

  In London, the BBC was keen to broadcast a radio programme about life aboard Amethyst, and a correspondent approached the Far East Station. Brind liked the idea, believing it would boost the ship and the families involved, and he gave his approval. The correspondent collected material on conditions in the frigate and also obtained personal accounts from several members of the crew. But the Admiralty and the Foreign Office learned of the programme and forced the BBC to drop it.

  The First Sea Lord, Admiral Fraser, told the corporation’s director general, Sir William Haley: ‘The Admiralty and the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that there were objections to this feature. It is government policy to avoid publicity in this country on the Amethyst case, in order not to prejudice the secret negotiations which are now being pursued for the release of the ship. We know that the Chinese Communist authorities are alert to publicity in this country.’ Fraser pointed out that the Admiralty sent a regular letter to the families to keep them informed. He suggested that the information collected by the correspondent could be included in the next Admiralty letter.2

  Haley replied: ‘We were naturally sorry not to be able to carry out the broadcast, but I quite understand the situation.’ He agreed that the Admiralty could use the material.3 Brind was not happy about the censorship: ‘We considered this carefully here and concluded the notes given to the BBC could do little harm and might well cheer up Amethyst.’4 The Admiralty, however, had no objection to the Amethyst men making record requests for a Listeners’ Choice programme. Some of the selections showed that the crew had not lost its sense of humour: Cruising Down The River (Ordinary Seaman Henry Harris); You Get Used To It (Able Seaman James McLean); and Swanee River (Lieutenant Hett). Flight Lieutenant Fearnley picked A Life On The Ocean Wave.

  Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin referred to the conflict in China during a speech to the Labour Party conference in Blackpool on 9 June, but he made no mention of Amethyst or the families waiting anxiously at home. His sympathies appeared to lie with the Chinese people: ‘The civil war has gone on, the Chinese suffer, and if there is any part of the world that really deserves peace it is China after the horrors she has had to undergo for all these years.’ He went on to stress the importance of trade.

  That day Coxswain Frank recorded in his diary: ‘King’s birthday, but not for Amethyst, no flags, no holiday, no salute, in fact no nothings. It looks like being a nice day but after eight weeks in the Yangtze we have learnt to our cost that it can be very deceptive. We learnt by signal today that our mail has reached Shanghai and that the [assistant] air attaché Howard-Williams is going to try and bring it up for us by Jeep. Good luck to the air force, we already have one of their doctors staying with us, and how thankful we are that he is here.’

  By 12 June Brind was having doubts about his approach to General Chu in Peking. Hong Kong was making discreet enquiries as to whether it was likely to be fruitful. The admiral decided that if he did not hear anything in a couple of days he would assume success in that direction was unlikely. Urquhart, the British consul in Shanghai, was also sounding out one of his contacts, who told him confidentially that a telegram recommending Amethyst’s release had been sent to Mao Tse-tung. But Communist leaders had taken exception to a crackdown on sympathisers in Hong Kong and Britain’s well-publicised move to send reinforcements to the colony. Brind believed that if the approach to Chu failed, then Urquhart should put pressure on the Communists over the threat to trade. Brind told Ambassador Stevenson: ‘Unless there are other delicate negotiations of which I am unaware I strongly favour going all out at Shanghai. There now seems to be no harm and much good in inferring that the early release of Amethyst is to say the least of it highly important to the progress of trade relations. In fact I should put on the screw here as hard as we possibly can for to continue friendly trade discussions whilst a British warship is forcibly detained is surely quite unacceptable.’5 The admiral may have reflected on a comment made by Admiral Kwei Yung-ching, head of the Nationalist navy, the previous month. Kwei told Brind that the only person on the Communist side who had the authority to deal with foreign affairs was Chou En-lai, who would soon become premier. It would appear that no approach was ever made to Chou.

  On 12 June Kerans had another meeting with Kang, who asked if there had been any message from the commander-in-chief. Kerans, briefed by Leo after the interpreter’s return from the embassy, said negotiations at the highest level were being attempted in Nanking and Peking. Kang was unaware of these moves and said he was willing to give Amethyst safe passage if his superiors agreed. It appeared the colonel was ‘hoping for a way out himself’. Further supplies of fresh vegetables were promised, and it was the ‘last comparatively peaceful meeting’ that Kerans would experience.

  Two days later Kerans received a message from Brind, who expressed astonishment that Kang had doubted the sincerity of his earlier assurances. Unless Kang confirmed that he was mistaken there would be n
o point in trying to negotiate with him. ‘I felt that if I passed on these words I might well find myself isolated,’ Kerans noted.

  A meeting on 15 June began with a long tirade by Kang. He insisted he was the only person who could discuss the political issues and that talks had to take place in Chingkiang. Fresh doubt was cast on the commander-in-chief’s assurances. At this point Kerans decided he would let Kang know what Brind thought of him, verbally and in writing. ‘He did not like this at all and appeared visibly shaken. I seized my opportunity and endeavoured to shift the scene of negotiations to Nanking or alternatively that Captain Donaldson should come down here.’ After a long time Kang agreed that Donaldson, the naval attaché, could be involved, so long as he did not have any diplomatic status and appeared in uniform.

  On returning from the meeting, Kerans received a message from Brind suggesting that the admiral might discontinue talks through Kang though that would not stop Amethyst’s captain dealing with him. The fuel position was a continuing concern. It was down to 94 tons. The weather was bad, with conditions hot and humid because of almost continuous rain, but the crew were still coping well.6

  In a message to Stevenson, Brind criticised Kerans for getting caught up in long meetings. ‘I hoped Kerans would have been able to take some initiative with a short interview just giving my message,’ he complained, noting that relations with Kang, the ‘original culprit’, were strained. The admiral wanted Donaldson to be involved and to take a firmer line and ‘not participate in protracted interviews punctuated by gross insults from Kang’. Donaldson should try to deal directly with General Yuan and sideline the colonel. Brind observed: ‘As price for release Communists are trying to force us to admit something we know to be untrue. This is Nazi technique and not what we expect of Chinese.’7

  At a brief meeting on 18 June Kang asked if the commander-in-chief had appointed a representative, and he was told it was being considered. Two days later Kerans went to General Yuan’s headquarters. The general repeated points made at previous meetings and said the commander-in-chief needed to appoint Captain Donaldson as his representative. If the admiral acknowledged there had been ‘intrusion’ and ‘infringement’ of Chinese territorial waters, then it might be possible to consider a separate solution for Amethyst’s release while talks continued on the question of apologies and compensation. Kerans thought this went a long way towards forming a possible basis for an understanding. Yuan expressed regret for Amethyst’s isolation on the Yangtze.8

  The British government – and Brind – faced another headache on 21 June. Nationalist aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the British merchant ship Anchises at the mouth of the Whangpoo River, leading to Shanghai. Four men were wounded and the ship ran aground. The Nationalists had decided to blockade ports in Communist hands. The frigate Black Swan was in the Yangtze and went up river to assist Anchises, a vessel of the Blue Funnel Line. But the frigate had orders not to enter the Whangpoo and she turned back. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Hall, told the Cabinet: ‘The result is the unsatisfactory situation in which a British ship may be attacked and put in urgent need of assistance, with a British warship close by and yet debarred from rendering such assistance.’ Brind gave new orders allowing warships to fire on aircraft in self-defence and those attacking British or other neutral merchant ships. Hall said the Communist authorities in Shanghai would be asked to allow warships to give humanitarian assistance. The following morning Anchises was strafed again.9

  By 22 June Amethyst’s fuel was down to 70 tons, and Kerans decided to shut off all power for 59-hour periods, even though the temperature was rising. Brind thought it was urgent to replenish Amethyst. The navy arranged for a merchant ship to take supplies from Hong Kong and was waiting for clearance to go up the Yangtze. But Kerans would learn ‘what masters the Chinese are in vacillation’. At a meeting in Chingkiang General Yuan refused to give clearance, saying the merchant ship would be infringing Chinese territorial waters. Kerans pointed out that as the Yangtze was now open to shipping there would not be any violation. He asked if Amethyst could have some of the fuel stored in Nanking and was told he would have to make a written application. The general reiterated his desire for a peaceful solution, and suggested an exchange of notes in which Britain would acknowledge ‘basic facts’ that a British warship ‘intruded indiscreetly’ into the frontier area of the PLA. Kerans was struck that Yuan referred to only one warship. It appeared that the general thought further delays could only be harmful to Anglo-Chinese friendship and business relations. Kerans concluded that Yuan did not after all want Captain Donaldson involved in negotiations.10

  In light of Yuan’s proposal, Brind drew up a draft agreement, which he sent to the Admiralty for approval. There were two key points. Amethyst had been near a main Communist crossing point when ‘a most unfortunate but not unnatural misunderstanding occurred which caused gunfire to be opened’. The other key point: ‘The admiral and the general deplore this most tragic and unfortunate incident. The admiral personally regrets that it was not found possible to inform the PLA of the intended movement of HMS Amethyst, that his appreciation of the situation at the time led to the movement so nearly coinciding with active operations by the PLA and that the fire of his ships should have caused Chinese casualties, the general on his part regrets the misunderstanding which resulted in casualties and damage to HMS Amethyst.’11

  In London, the Cabinet also considered Yuan’s proposal, but it did not see Brind’s draft agreement. Ministers recognised the hardships being suffered by the crew and thought ‘every effort’ should be made to take advantage of the Communists’ change in attitude. However, the First Lord of the Admiralty had been advised that admitting Amethyst ‘intruded indiscreetly’ would probably prejudice the government’s case if it decided to seek compensation. It was agreed that Lord Hall and the foreign secretary would think again about the response. So the crew would have to carry on enduring the hardships.12

  There was some cheer for the men on 24 June when three bags of mail turned up after ‘very persistent efforts’ by Leo and one of the sailors at the post office in Chingkiang. The mail had been sent from Shanghai unsealed so that it could be checked easily, but Communist military and postal officials initially refused to hand over the bags on the grounds that everything should have been sealed. It was obvious, though, that the mail had been examined – and pilfered.

  There appeared to be some progress on the negotiating front. Kerans told Brind that the general was prepared to give Amethyst safe conduct. The admiral sent a revised agreement, saying: ‘I recognise that HMS Amethyst unfortunately entered the People’s Liberation Army frontier zone without the knowledge and concurrence of the command of the PLA. I am sure that you will share my deep regret at the casualties on both sides.’ Kerans was given discretion to change the wording but advised not to make any major changes without consultation. The admiral decided that he no longer needed to call on the services of Donaldson. Later he ordered the words ‘knowledge and’ to be deleted, and he did not want the use of ‘indiscreetly’ or ‘imprudently’.13

  Kerans believed the next meeting, dealing with the agreement, would be straightforward and quick, but he suffered a bad attack of fibrositis due to extreme dampness and when he tried to arrange talks he was informed that the general and Kang were away, and the first week of July would be devoted to victory celebrations. Brind told Donaldson: ‘I think this is another trick on Kerans and feel he is nearing the end of his tether, that Communists know it and are playing with him.’ The admiral thought Donaldson was needed.14

  But Brind knew it was important to continue to support Kerans. ‘It is increasingly clear that Kang is deliberately attacking you personally with typical technique of creating suspense to get you down,’ the admiral warned. ‘This delay after hopeful situation supports this. They may have read some of our plain language signals and think we are weakening our wording which we certainly are not. Do not worry too much about prejudicing your position. Comm
unists certainly have anxieties too.’15

  16

  The Colonel’s Big Mistake

  IF KERANS’S TORMENTOR, COLONEL KANG, had been planning the complete humiliation of Amethyst, seeking her surrender, he made a major mistake. Kerans had asked General Yuan if he could have some of the navy’s oil fuel being stored at Hogee Wharf, Nanking. The request was passed to Kang, who gave his approval on 30 June. ‘This was welcome news indeed,’ Kerans noted, though he was aware that getting approval and actually receiving the fuel were two different obstacles.

  But late on 9 July a large junk towed by an underpowered launch was sighted near Amethyst. It was the fuel, 294 drums of it, amounting to 54 invaluable tons. The junk only came alongside the frigate after ‘many altercations’ with the local garrison, and a battle with the current, which kept taking it downstream. It was too dangerous to try to get the fuel on board in the darkness, and all hands faced the difficult task at dawn the next day. There had been heavy rain for many days but 10 July, fortunately, was clear.1

  Able Seaman Thomas Townsend recalled:

  The first question on everybody’s mind was ‘How the hell are we going to get it aboard?’ Slowly the realisation came, it’s going to be done with muscle. It was a hot day. Every barrel had to be hauled up by derrick and rolled along the deck and poured into the tanks by hand. It was incredible the way it was done. Everybody got stuck in. Everybody was covered in oil and sweat, and everybody was aching from head to toe. We started early in the morning and worked right through the day non-stop.

  But there was never a time when we thought we’d have to give up. We knew that one day it was going to come right. When the food started running out and we went on rations there wasn’t a complaint. Nobody moaned. We were prepared to stick it out even if we got down to the last crumb. We weren’t going to turn round to these people and say, ‘Please let us go’. I spent my nineteenth birthday up there.2