Yangtze Showdown Page 9
At home, anger at the attacks on the ships was growing, as Harry Pollitt, secretary of Britain’s Communist Party, discovered. He unwisely tried to address an open-air meeting in the naval town of Dartmouth. Some 1,000 people gathered and there were furious exchanges. The father of Petty Officer John Akhurst, from Dartmouth, who was killed in Consort, stepped forward and handed Pollitt a rope with a noose and a note saying: ‘Judas Iscariot was presented with one of these and used it. I invite you to do likewise – C F Akhurst, father of one of the boys your friends murdered on the Yangtze River on Wednesday, April 20.’
Someone shouted: ‘Who paid for the shell that killed Mr Akhurst’s son?’ Pollitt replied: ‘I am prepared to say on the authority of The Times and the Daily Express that the shells which Communists and Nationalists are firing were sent from the US. I will apologise if, on the authority of The Times, it should be proved that there are any Russian arms in China at all.’
There were boos, cries of ‘Down with Russia’, an egg smashed at his feet, and a red flag was grabbed, trampled on and burned. A man shouted: ‘What would you do if you were in the Amethyst?’ Pollitt said: ‘I should do what our British boys are doing. I should be asking, “Why were we ordered up here without someone making sure it was known to the authorities on both sides of the river?”’ There were a few more exchanges and then the crowd surged forward. As police appealed for calm, fighting broke out. Pollitt was escorted away and took refuge in the home of one of his supporters, which was surrounded by about 100 people. He managed to escape in the early hours.9 Despite his reception at Dartmouth, the brash Pollitt turned up in Plymouth, Amethyst’s home city, two days later for another speaking engagement. Sailors and ex-navy men forced the doors of the hall where the meeting was being held, shouting, ‘What about the Amethyst?’ A steward was knocked down and chairs were thrown at the platform. The doors were wedged shut with a ladder as around 5,000 people gathered outside, shouting and booing. Police pushed Pollitt and another Communist official into a side room. They eventually escaped in a police car.10
A similar incident took place in Melbourne when angry sailors and former sevicemen confronted Communist leaders at a meeting near the Yarra River. In response to shouts about Amethyst, Communist official John Arrowsmith said: ‘The British imperialists sent warships up the Yangtze and they were inadvertently fired at by both sides because they were right in the firing line.’ He taunted hecklers by saying they ‘needed a full rum issue to stand up to the Russian army’. The sailors rushed at the Communists’ platform with cries of ‘throw him in the river’. Police broke up the meeting, and Arrowsmith was punched on the head as he tried to leave in a car.11
With some irony, Australia’s prime minister, Ben Chifley, whose government had prevented Shoalhaven from sailing up the Yangtze to Nanking, was in London for the 1949 Commonwealth conference. It would be many years before the Shoalhaven decision was revealed. Chifley made no public comment on Amethyst. He was seen walking in St James’s Park, smoking his pipe and ‘admiring the spring showing of flowers’.12
On 24 April the Sunday Express devoted much of its front page to the crisis, with the banner headline, WHO FAILED BRITAIN?. Below the headline was the sub-deck, Questions on the Yangtze disaster that need to be answered. The report was bylined Group Captain H S L Dundas DSO, DFC, air correspondent, and Alan Brockbank, naval correspondent, and asked two further questions. Who ordered the ships up the Yangtze between two armies in full battle, without air cover? Who is responsible for the lack of aircraft in China to give coverage had it been ordered? It was pointed out that such questions would normally be answered by the minister of defence, Albert Alexander, in the House of Commons – but he was due to go on holiday the following day. Alexander had arranged to sail from Southampton in the ‘luxury pleasure ship Venus’ for Oslo, where he would be attending May Day celebrations. The report suggested that it might be ‘judicious’ to abandon the trip. On the question of air cover, there was specualtion that one wing of bomb and rocket-carrying aircraft could have averted disaster, but the RAF’s Mosquitos and Beaufighters were left ‘sitting inactive 3,000 miles away in Singapore’. And the nearest aircraft carrier was ‘half a world away’ in the Mediterranean. On 25 April a leader in the Daily Express accused the ruling socialists of a blame game involving the Foreign Office, Alexander and Lord Hall. It had further questions. Who is to be punished? Who is to be cashiered, so that never again can his folly jeopardise the lives of our fighting men?
That day Admiral Brind wrote another letter to his wife Edie: ‘What a lot I have left on Alex’s [Madden’s] shoulders, though it is hard to say whether I should have been able to help him much more from Singapore. But it does seem to be wrong to be at home when this is going on. Poor Alex and his chaps have been having a very hard time; we have got to find a way out for little Amethyst and the Shanghai problem is a real bad one – with 4,800 of our nationals there’ [The British Government was concerned that Communists forces would soon seize Shanghai, threatening nationals and business interests]’. Brind went on: ‘I have felt very much at a loose end here, although I think I have been able to help to some extent. The press is (a large part of it) very hostile, some against the navy, talking of blunders in high places, and some against the ministers. This latter I resent, for they cannot possibly be held responsible for professional matters like the Amethyst operation.’ He had decided to cut short his visit to Britain and return to the Far East: ‘It is natural that folk should wonder why the blazes I am here.’
On the morning of 26 April, Prime Minister Clement Attlee held a Cabinet meeting. Among those present were Foreign Secretary Bevin and Minister of Defence Alexander, who had, in fact, postponed his visit to Norway. Lord Hall, Admiral Fraser, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, were also invited. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss a statement that Attlee would make on the Amethyst crisis in the Commons that afternoon. Lord Hall planned to make a similar statement in the House of Lords.
There was some discussion on whether reference should be made to the fact that movements of British warships in China had been done with the full knowledge and consent of the Nationalist government. But it was noted: ‘Since it was obvious that the authority of the National government had been greatly weakened, it might be said that this was a formal rather than a practical step to have taken; and attention was drawn to a statement issued by the Chinese embassy in London on the previous day that the National government had advised foreign powers in February last to withdraw warships from the Yangtze in view of the risk of incidents.’ It was decided to delete references in the draft statement to the ‘inhumanity’ of the Communists’ actions because of the risks that Amethyst and British communities in China were still facing.
11
The Politicians Fight it Out
THERE WERE ANGRY CLASHES IN the Commons on 26 April after Attlee made a lengthy statement on the Yangtze attacks. The Conservative leader, Winston Churchill, accused the Labour government of blaming senior officers in the Far East for its own failings. Gesturing towards Minister of Defence Alexander, Churchill said: ‘Should you not have kept in close touch instead of leaving it to the men on the spot? Would it not have been right for you to know that this ship [Amethyst] was to proceed up the river, with the Communists entrenched on the north bank for weeks and that the armistice was expiring in a few hours? Surely the government should have known that. It ought to have been in the closest touch with its officers on the spot instead of throwing the whole burden on them and expecting to get off behind them for all its muddles.’
Attlee leaped from the front bench ‘as if he had been sprung up’, and said: ‘I am not prepared to take that from Mr Churchill. Of course we keep in touch with the situation. There is no question of sheltering behind any commander.’ Churchill was perhaps being mischievous. As Admiral Brind had pointed out to his wife, ministers were not res
ponsible for routine operational matters. It is not clear if even Foreign Secretary Bevin and Admiral Fraser knew about Amethyst’s movements, and it is doubtful whether Alexander or Lord Hall were informed. But Attlee would have found it difficult to admit to a packed Commons that his government had been in the dark.
Churchill raised the question of air power, and asked why the navy did not have aircraft carriers off the coast of China ‘capable of affording protection to our nationals in the only way understood by those who attack and murder and insult us – namely by the effective power of retaliation’. Attlee stressed that there was no question of air cover because it would have turned a peaceful mission into an act of war. On the timing of Amethyst’s trip, he pointed out that the frigate sailed from Shanghai on 19 April, expecting to arrive the following day, and the Communist ultimatum to the Nationalist government did not expire until the 21st. Churchill demanded that the government deal with the crisis in a ‘robust spirit’.
The question of air power was pursued by other Members of Parliament. Conservative John Boyd-Carpenter noted that there had been two aircraft carriers on the Far East Station two years earlier. ‘Where are they now?’ he asked. Attlee stressed again that Amethyst was engaged on a peaceful mission and not a punitive war – and none of the questioners had suggested what use would be made of aircraft in those conditions. When Conservatives derided that remark, the prime minister said: ‘I am quite well aware that aircraft are used in warfare but this is not a matter of warfare at all. The ships were engaged in bringing up supplies and it would have been quite unusual to provide a bomber force in such an operation.’ The point about supplies was misleading, as a briefing paper for the foreign secretary had already noted. The main argument for having a guardship at Nanking was to evacuate nationals in an emergency, and Amethyst was sent specifically to relieve Consort.
The Conservative deputy leader, Anthony Eden, argued that if it was not provocative to send warships up the Yangtze, why would it have been any more of a provocation to give them air cover? When Attlee appeared unwilling to reply, opposition MPs shouted, ‘Answer’. The prime minister seemed to contradict his earlier statement about not sheltering behind any commander, saying: ‘I leave these matters to be decided by commanders on the spot. I am not trying to shelter myself. I take full responsibility. But now I am being asked to give details of how to conduct this operation of keeping a warship at Nanking.’ Conservative MP Brigadier Antony Head was shouted down by Labour members when he observed: ‘The inference is that no air support was available.’ Attlee admitted that the RAF did not have any planes based in Shanghai.
In his initial statement, the prime minister said that Ambassador Stevenson and consular officials had remained at their posts in China because of Britain’s considerable interests. Movements of warships had taken place with the consent of the Nationalist government. ‘I want to make the point, therefore, that the Amethyst was proceeding on her lawful occasions and that there was no other properly constituted authority to whom the government were under any obligation to notify her movements.’
Attlee pointed to the urgency of relieving Consort because the destroyer was low on supplies. This was misleading. Consort’s captain revealed in his report on the ship’s actions of 20 April that he could have remained a lot longer at Nanking where, in any case, there was a large reserve of fuel oil. The prime minister also made the odd claim that Amethyst needed to replace Consort because a frigate was more suitable than a destroyer.
Two key questions had arisen from the attacks on the British ships. Why did they suffer such extensive damage and casualties? Why were they not able to silence the opposing batteries and fight their way through? ‘In answer to the first, I would only say that warships are not designed to operate in rivers against massed artillery and infantry sheltered by reeds,’ said Attlee. ‘The Communist forces appeared to have been concentrated in considerable strength and are reported as being lavishly equipped with howitzers, medium artillery and field guns. These facts also provide much of the answer to the second question – the flag officer’s policy throughout was designed only to rescue the Amethyst and to avoid unnecessary casualties. There was no question of a punitive expedition, and our ships fired only to silence the forces firing against them.’
Although there might have been an initial misunderstanding, there was no excuse for mistaking the identity of Amethyst, and the prime minister rejected as ‘fantastic and unfounded’ Communist claims that British ships had been trying to oppose the crossing of the Yangtze. He criticised Communist leaders for failing to respond to ‘our ambassador’s message’. This was misleading. Ambassador Stevenson had refused to be involved directly, and two messages had come from the consul in Peking. The prime minister continued: ‘Moreover, had the Communist authorities objected in the past to the movement of British ships on the Yangtze it was always open to them to raise these through our consular authorities in north China. It is the fact that for reasons best known to themselves the Communists have failed to notify any foreign authority present in areas which they have occupied of the channels through which contact can be maintained and that they have rejected all communications made to them. In these circumstances the government can only reserve its position.’
The prime minister expressed deepest sympathy with the relatives of the dead and wounded, and paid tribute to the conduct of Amethyst’s ship’s company, which was ‘beyond all praise’, especially as so many sailors were young and had not experienced being under fire before. Five people were named for their courage and fortitude – Lieutenant Commander Bernard Skinner, Lieutenant Geoffrey Weston, Telegraphist Jack French, Flight Lieutenant Ken Letford, the Sunderland pilot, and diplomat Edward Youde. Attlee continued: ‘I have heard too that in HMS London and HMS Black Swan, when there was a possibility of volunteers being flown to the Amethyst, there was almost acrimonious rivalry for selection, as they put it, “to go back for more”.’
In the Lords, Lord Hall repeated the prime minister’s statement and then faced questioning from Lord Swinton, the acting Conservative leader in the house. Had it really been necessary to relieve Consort? The destroyer could have been ordered to return to Shanghai, and arrangements made for planes to take part in any evacuation from Nanking. When did the Cabinet, the Admiralty and the minister of defence consider the matter? Lord Hall seemed to confirm that ministers had been caught out by events, replying: ‘We have not the whole facts. Certain facts were brought to our notice today. But further investigation will have to take place.’ Tellingly, there was no mention in Parliament that Amethyst had replaced Shoalhaven because the Australian government refused to send its ship. Nor was there any reference to a similar refusal by the US Navy.
That evening the Admiralty issued a statement in which Vice Admiral Madden saluted the crews of all the ships. In addition to the names mentioned in the Commons, there was praise for Lieutenant Peter Berger, Surgeon Lieutenant John Alderton, Gunner Eric Monaghan and Electrical Artificer Lionel Chare, who had refused to take any rest until he had rigged up emergency lighting in Amethyst and helped with the wounded. Two Royal Marines from London who turned down medical treatment for 24 hours until more urgent cases were dealt with were also commended – Bernard How had a hole right through his shoulder and Robert McCarthy had a piece of shrapnel the size of a cork embedded in his neck.1
On the day that Parliament tackled the issue, Communist troops were still pouring across the Yangtze. Large numbers of junks passed ahead and astern of Amethyst. Shortly before noon there was a significant development. The Communists apparently were ready to talk. Three soldiers and two civilians appeared on the south bank and began shouting at the ship, indicating that they wanted a boat to be sent. Amethyst’s remaining whaler had been patched up, but Lieutenant Commander Kerans did not want to risk it in the choppy waters. A Chinese steward, shouting back, tried to point this out, and eventually the party left. At about 1600 the soldiers returned without the civilians. As the weather conditio
ns were now calm Kerans decided to send the whaler and he called for a volunteer crew of strong swimmers, who quickly came forward. Kerans did not want to risk one of his few officers, and it was decided to put a volunteer, Petty Officer William Freeman, in charge and wearing Lieutenant George Strain’s uniform so that ‘face’ – so important in Chinese society – would not be lost. When the boat reached the shore, Freeman and steward But Sai Tin, acting as an interpreter, were taken to a nearby village. After an hour’s wait an officer arrived. He was identified as ‘Major Kung’, commander of the main battery opposite Rose Island that had launched the devastating attack on Amethyst.
Talks began and the first point raised by Major Kung was the responsibility for opening fire. He insisted that Amethyst had fired first. Freeman, of course, denied this. Kung said the frigate was recognised as British and he had given orders to his battery to return fire only if attacked. He went on to state that the ship would not be harmed provided there was ‘no trouble’ and she did not move from her anchorage. He was not empowered to grant safe passage down river – permission would have to come from the new authorities in Nanking. The Sunderland flying boat was fired on because it did not have clearance from the PLA. When it was pointed out that the plane had been on a mercy mission, Kung said his men would have provided medical help.
British gunfire resulted in some 250 casualties among Communist forces and the local peasantry. The inlet at San Chiang Ying opposite Rose Island had been packed with junks and other craft, and the area was ‘plastered’ by Consort when she passed Amethyst. Kung asked about British casualties and the figures were given. Kerans reported: ‘The interview throughout was reasonably cordial and it became evident in conversation that he was worried about outside reaction to the People’s Liberation Army. He wound up the meeting by stating that the Chinese and British had always been friends. Major Kung spoke a little English towards the close of the interview, and offered to assist us with a sampan in future.’ Kerans was left with the impression that his superiors had reprimanded Kung for his hasty actions. There was also confirmation that Amethyst was trapped and that any further help from the air was out of the question because it would only attract fire. The meeting was reported to Madden.