Yangtze Showdown Page 26
Kerans obviously felt guilt over the fate of Leo because on 21 November he recommended him for an award. The recommendation stated:
He did much to help me, not only in correct translations but in his very sound advice on Chinese cosmogony and Communist methods of dilatoriness and intransigence. In addition his cheerful manner and quiet confidence did much to help and reassure the ship’s company that everything possible was being done. He was of immeasurable assistance to me in obtaining the entry of stores, mail and fresh food. His loyalty to the Royal Navy was of a very high order, and though he was finally taken prisoner by the Communists to undergo political indoctrination, I do not consider that Communism will even now have much effect upon him. Throughout the negotiations he remained as neutral as was possible and clearly pointed out to the Communists that he was there purely as an interpreter and a translator.
As well as supporting compensation, Stevenson recommended that Leo should be awarded an honorary MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire) of the civil division. The Admiralty agreed that it would be a ‘most appropriate award’, and ‘we would be prepared to put forward the recommendation if, or when, the Foreign Office consider there is no objection politically’.4
The Foreign Office, still keen to improve relations with the Communists because of British business interests, was not enthusiastic, with one official pointing out: ‘The auspices are far from being favourable and I think we can only bring it up in six months’ time for reconsideration.’ Another official noted that conditions needed to improve.5 Leo received £1,000 in compensation from the Admiralty but he was never awarded the MBE. He did not go back to his job in the naval attaché’s office, supposedly because of his poor health as a consequence of his treatment by the Communists. But sadly, he was viewed as a security risk and the British embassy – and other embassies – would not employ him. With his compensation Leo bought a salt business but that failed when the Communists decide to control the sale of salt. On 29 September 1954 he died. Leo had been receiving regular medical treatment since 1950 and his health deteriorated sharply in the final months.
His widow got in touch with the British embassy, now located in Peking, and pointed out that his medical expenses had been heavy and that in 1953 the family had started selling their belongings to pay for them, also borrowing from relatives and friends. As a result, the family were in debt. Leo’s widow appealed for financial help from Britain. In a letter to the Foreign Office’s Establishment and Organisation Department in November 1954, the Nanking embassy pointed out:
From time to time we get appeals from widows of former pensioners or recipients of recurring gratuities for money to meet funeral expenses or pay debts. It has been our practice to refuse any payment in these cases since to act otherwise would be to create what might well be an expensive precedent. We think, however, that in the special circumstances of Mr Leo’s case some further payment should be made. His service was exceptionally meritorious and, through no fault of his own, the compensation already paid him, although generous, did not fulfil its object, which was to provide adequately for himself and for his family for his remaining years. Mr Leo’s case is really not at all on a par with other cases of old-age pensioners. He volunteered for the job in Amethyst, at great and obvious risk to himself and his dependants. As a result of this he became unemployable by ourselves or by any other foreign embassy in China – no western government could take the risk of taking him on after his ‘re-education’.
It was recommended that Leo’s widow should be given £200 as ‘a final compassionate grant’.6 The Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office supported the idea of a payment, but other officials were cautious, pointing out that Leo was an Admiralty employee. It was ‘extremely important’ not to allow the case to set a precedent.7
In January 1955 the Foreign Office sent a copy of the letter from the embassy to the Admiralty, noting: ‘We consider that Peking have a very good case for some payment being made. If this had been our responsibility, we should certainly have supported the application, and hope that you will be able to seek Treasury approval for the additional payment.’ The Admiralty was advised to tell the Treasury that in 1949 the ambassador had recommended Leo for an MBE, which was not awarded for ‘political reasons’.8
The correspondence had been sent to the Admiralty’s M (Military) Branch, which decided that it should be dealt with by C E (Civil Establishment) Branch. C E Branch had been involved in the original payment of £1,000 to Leo. However, it emerged that a similar claim had been made by another Chinese national – his name was not revealed – for ‘recognition of services rendered by him to officers of HMS Amethyst’.9
C E Branch had just asked the Treasury for approval to make a payment of £1,000 to the man, who was forced to flee China, apparently leaving his wife behind. In view of Leo’s ‘undoubted valuable services to us and the unfortunate consequences for him, it would seem churlish not to attempt to alleviate his widow’s present plight’. There was concern about setting a precedent, but if other officials at the Admiralty agreed, an approach to the Treasury for a payment of £200 would be made.
By April 1955 the question of a payment to Leo’s widow had not been settled. The embassy in Peking contacted the Foreign Office again because it had received a further letter from her and she ‘appears to be in desperate straits’. C E Branch delayed contacting the Treasury about Leo’s widow. There had been some argument over the proposal to give the other man £1,000. In the end the Treasury decided it would approve a payment of only £500.
In July Admiralty officials agreed to ask the Treasury to give Leo’s widow £200 in view of the strong recommendations from the embassy in Peking and the Foreign Office. Leo had, in fact, signed an agreement that no further claims would be made by him or on his behalf, and one official pointed out: ‘The loss of much of the original £1,000 gratuity in a salt business was presumably one of the hazards of life under Communist rule and can hardly be attributed to the fact that he was an ex-employee of the British government.’10
On 29 July one C A Pace of C E Branch wrote a lengthy letter to one P L Smith at the Treasury seeking approval for an ex-gratia payment of £200 to Leo’s widow and explaining the background. Pace acknowledged that it was unusual to make a payment to a widow of a former employee who had been compensated already.
But on the other hand, this is undoubtedly a very exceptional and possibly unique case in as much as Mr Leo’s imprisonment by the Communists, which in turn led to his decline in health and ultimately we assume to his death, was due entirely to his connections with HMS Amethyst and the escape of the ship from the Yangtze. In compensating Mr Leo to the tune of £1,000 we recognised that his health had been impaired by his imprisonment and that his prospects of earning a living had deteriorated, but it would I think be true to say that the £1,000 was not intended to cover the cost of regular medical attention after his release from prison.
Smith at the Treasury replied on 10 August and was entirely unsympathetic, writing:
We are not happy about the grounds on which Mr Leo was paid £1,000 and this further application does not make us any happier. I am far from convinced that Mr Leo did in fact perform service of an exceptionally meritorious character and when the skipper of the Amethyst put him ashore he did so in the best interests of Mr Leo. That is past history of course but it must influence us in the present case. So far as I can judge there is no reason on ‘good employer’ grounds why you should pay anything to Mrs Leo.
C E Branch sent a copy of Smith’s letter to the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office on 16 August. The Admiralty regarded it as ‘a rather strange reply’. But the entire matter was passed back to the Foreign Office, with the suggestion that the £200 payment could be made from funding known as the Foreign Office Vote.
The Treasury response did not go down well with the Foreign Office either. The Foreign Office told C E Branch: ‘We are far from satisfied with the way in which the Treasury have turned
down your application and are not prepared to let the matter rest where it is. We are ourselves convinced that Mr Leo was a very good servant of Her [His] Majesty’s government who fully deserved the original award.’ The Admiralty was urged to take the matter up again with the Treasury. The suggestion that the Foreign Office might care to pay the £200 was not well received. ‘Although we have a very real interest in this case, we cannot see any good reasons for trying to make it a charge on the Foreign Office Vote nor any prospect of success if we did so. Payment when it is made must, of course, relate to the original payment to Mr Leo. On these grounds it should be borne on the Admiralty Vote.’11
Pace of the C E Branch was back in touch with Smith on 13 September, telling him of the Foreign Office’s displeasure. It was now accepted that it would be ‘administratively convenient’ for the payment to Mrs Leo to come from the Admiralty Vote. Smith was asked to reconsider his views. The Treasury official took nearly two months to reply. Smith was not backing down. He wrote:
The statements and arguments in support of the payments to or on behalf of Mr Leo have been so conflicting that we consider it worthwhile to restate the position. In January 1950 we approved the payment, ex-gratia, of £1,000 because there were some grounds for accepting the view that Mr Leo had suffered physical and mental impairment affecting his earning capacity as a result of his experiences. He was therefore given the benefit of the doubt, which would not have been given to an employee of HMG in this country where we should have insisted on medical evidence in support of the payment. Subsequent correspondence in which it was proposed that Mr Leo should be re-employed certainly tended to suggest that our original doubts were extremely real.
Smith pointed out that there had been an undertaking that no further claims would be made. Such undertakings would be worthless if additional payments were made. Smith concluded: ‘Against this background and my opinion that we are under no moral or legal obligation to Mrs Leo and my further opinion that non payment would not harm us politically and payment would not help us politically to any measurable extent and would be likely moreover to excite other claims I come to the conclusion that we cannot agree to any further payment being made.’ And there the matter appears to have ended. Mrs Leo did not get her £200. Her fate is unclear.
Much of the official correspondence relating to Sam Leo was originally closed until 2031, a surprising 82 years after Amethyst’s escape. It was released only because of requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The name of the other Chinese man who helped Amethyst’s officers remains secret, presumably because there are still relatives living in China.
29
Looking Back
IN THE MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED Amethyst’s escape John Kerans had time to reflect on the ship’s ordeal, and in February 1950 The Naval Review, the Royal Navy’s independent and restricted forum, published an article by Kerans on some of the less publicised points. The account is a good illustration of the resourcefulness that was necessary for day-to-day survival on the Yangtze. These are edited extracts:
CO-OPERATION. This was in evidence right from the start when the embassy in Nanking became aware of the disaster that had overtaken Amethyst. The commander-in-chief of the Nationalist navy, Admiral Kwei Yung-chin (now in Formosa) offered every facility and help that he could to assist Amethyst’s wounded; his orders were quickly conveyed to the Nationalist army authorities in the immediate neighbourhood of Rose Island, where the ship had grounded.
Later in Shanghai the US authorities placed the hospital ship Repose from Tsingtao at the Royal Navy’s disposal. By this time the Nationalist army had successfully evacuated by train from Changchow (about 15 miles due south of Rose Island) some 60 ratings who had been ordered to evacuate the ship when under fire to avoid further loss of life; due to minefields they could not rejoin her.
The very ready assistance of the Royal Air Force in Sunderlands from Hong Kong was of the highest order. The Yangtze is not an easy place to land in, and Communist gunfire did not assist matters. The help of the RAF medical officer [Flight Lieutenant Michael Fearnley] was invaluable and things might well have been difficult without his presence.
MORALE. There is no doubt that this was the most important point of all to consider from the word go; an incident of this nature which came with such suddenness is bound to affect those concerned in various ways. From all the evidence that I have gathered, there is everything to show that morale was of a high order, in spite of the extreme youth of many ratings. When I joined on 22 April, though, it was near breaking point. After three days under fire and with little rest, this was not surprising. In addition, the presence of 17 dead on board for over 56 hours was a depressing influence. In spite of all, they were prepared for the last rites by a valiant team of petty officers and a few junior ratings. Eventually, when the ship’s company realised the situation and the hopelessness of movement either way, there was a distinct hardening of determination to stick it out and face the future with equanimity and confidence.
I decided that a strict service routine must, and would be, adhered to from the beginning. This continued throughout and with watchkeeping every day and night on the bridge as well as considerable damage repairs, this kept the men fit and physically tired.
Non-working hours were hard to fill. We were lucky to have a fairly plentiful supply of gramophone records. No attempt by officers was ever made to institute recreational games for ratings. This bore fruit and it was not long before they made their own entertainment. I have felt that there is nothing more a sailor dislikes than being organised into whist drives or other such ideas, which eventually finish up as a dismal flop.
The ship’s company were always kept fully informed (as far as possible) of the outcome of all my meetings with the PLA. I did, however, never at any time give them any assurance that events would be speedy – it was a personal opinion, which became truer as time unfortunately wore on. Certain selected chief and petty officers were given access to the ship’s signal log each day. This did much to help morale and gave petty officers a clearer knowledge of the issues at stake, and acted as a deterrent to the proverbial false ‘buzzes’.
In addition, the knowledge that everything possible was being done by all authorities elsewhere to extract Amethyst gave the ship’s company added assurance and confidence. The ability to receive and send telegrams helped immeasurably (265 were despatched during our 101 days internment). Inability to send outgoing mail was unfortunate but we did receive three bags towards the end of June. For reasons best known to the PLA they were well censored and pilfered. The presence of two domestics and a cat and a dog, which had somehow survived the shelling, tended to produce an air of normalcy in messdeck life.
VICTUALLING. This was an important problem from the beginning and needed much care and attention as it was considered essential to provide a balanced diet, with as much additional variety as stocks permitted, to give some compensatory advantage in the circumstances we had found ourselves. Fortuitously Amethyst was well stocked, having just left Hong Kong, and in addition was carrying flour and frying oil and other provisions for the embassy in Nanking to replace emergency stocks that the lengthened stay of Consort had depleted.
Mercifully the forward galley remained intact and was in constant use throughout; there was thus no difficulty in baking bread and the provision of hot meals. Casualties amongst cooks (whites as well as Chinese) were nil, which was salutary. By bartering with supplies of flour, frying oil, soap, duffel coats, sea boots and other articles we were able to augment our fare with eggs and potatoes. Later on we were able to obtain Communist money (Jen Min Piao, which translated means People’s Money) and increase our purchases. For large amounts I was able on occasions to use Hong Kong currency. Whichever way one looks at it we lost heavily on the rate of exchange, and their prices were as the opposition wished. Perhaps I reached the limit when after three months I discovered Shanghai-brewed beer was available in Chingkiang by paying approximately 12s 6d per bottle. I
was determined that the ship’s company would have some amenities, leaving final payment until later. The commander-in-chief kindly allowed public money to be used and eventually the station central amenities fund reimbursed the crown. This gave a great morale boost. The daily issue of rum continued as usual – stocks of this were sufficient for many months ahead. This is not surprising when 25 out of the 68 were under 20 years of age.
When I went on half rations at the beginning of July the seriousness of the situation was very quickly brought home to many ratings. This mainly concerned conservation of cold room stocks and butter, milk, sugar and tea. Looking back on it now there was sufficient calorific value at each meal not to cause undue anxiety; the main trouble was lack of variety. A careful tally was kept on each item each week and the limiting dates of each article were reassessed. By the end of August it was estimated that starvation would have been very close. Still I was preparing to go on quarter rations early in August. Difficulty in maintaining morale might have been hard. Lack of food was one of my reasons for the break-out.