Yangtze Showdown Page 18

  Later that evening there was a serious problem with one of Amethyst’s boilers – No 2 – and the ship slowed down in time to avoid ‘disaster’. The frigate stopped for 45 minutes before steam could be raised in No 1 boiler, and engine-room staff worked through the night to get the other boiler working. Jamaica offered to send over an engineer officer and ratings but Kerans declined. Later Amethyst signalled that she was shipping water aft and, with her reduced crew, found it difficult dealing with the problem. Cossack stood by with towing gear but the frigate was able to carry on in reasonable weather.

  At 1000 on 3 August, Amethyst steamed into Hong Kong harbour ‘to a tremendous welcome which none of us will forget’. Kerans took the precaution of asking for a tug to follow him in case his battered ship faltered. But she berthed without difficulty, showing fifteen shell holes on the starboard side, six on the port side and twenty-three on the upper deck. Some of her sailors were in borrowed uniforms, and Jamaica’s skipper, Captain Frank Ballance, himself a DSO winner, had given Kerans a length of the medal ribbon. Craft of all sizes greeted Amethyst, and planes of the RAF saluted her. Many thousands lined the waterfront in the rain.

  Daily Express reporter Frank Goldsworthy had boarded Amethyst for the last leg of the journey. ‘That arrival in Hong Kong was a great emotional experience,’ he recalled. ‘It brings a lump to my throat and tears to my eyes. Every ship in the harbour was hooting. There were fire floats with great jets of water. The crews of two cruisers were lining the rails to cheer us on our way. This was such a moment for these lads who had been 100 days isolated from the rest of the navy.’7

  The governor of the colony, Sir Alexander Grantham, Admiral Brind, other service chiefs and local dignitaries were on the quayside. Fireworks exploded. As Amethyst secured, Brind sent the signal ‘Manoeuvre well executed’. It was, according to Kerans, ‘the most pleasing signal of all’.8

  Brind paid tribute to the ship’s company: ‘You may not perhaps even yet fully realise what the exploit of HMS Amethyst has meant to our country. Failure in an endeavour to escape would have been disastrous with far-reaching effects on the Far East and the attitude of its peoples to the British.’ He added: ‘You have suffered much, but you are supremely fortunate in that you have each played a great part in a story which will be told and retold so long as the British navy is remembered – that is so long as Britain lives. You are an example too us all.’

  The admiral made a comment that the men might have taken issue with later. He said: ‘From the beginning I was anxious that you should eventually prepare to escape in this way, but I was even more anxious that I should say nothing which would force your captain’s hand as the man on the spot.’ According to Brind’s staff officer operations, Commander Peter Dickens, and his first lieutenant, David Scott, the admiral had for a long time refused to consider the possibility of escape, thinking that negotiations would be successful. It was Dickens, believing from the start that there was only one option, who pushed the idea ‘at every opportunity’. Kerans, too, would claim that escape had been on his mind from the outset but Hett, one of the few officers on board Amethyst, pointed out that the captain consistently refused to discuss the subject whenever others brought it up. If Colonel Kang had not agreed to allow the ship to have the crucial supply of oil fuel from Nanking, Kerans might well have left it too late to escape anyway.

  Offers of hospitality from Hong Kong residents poured in, but there was one sour note as far as French the telegraphist was concerned. After the attack on 20 April the ship’s NAAFI manager, John MacNamara, had handed out sweets and cigarettes to the wounded. This went on for 48 hours before sailors were told to start paying again. After Amethyst arrived in Hong Kong NAAFI bosses decided that the loss needed to be made up. ‘They persisted to the nth degree that every penny had to be paid,’ said French. ‘This stuck in my craw. The fact is that they could have lost the whole lot of goods if we had scuttled the ship. And it went on and on until it was decided by the base in Hong Kong that the NAAFI would be paid from the sports club fund.’9

  Robert Stone was one of the sailors who escaped after the initial attack, swimming to Rose Island. He ended up in Hong Kong and was assigned to anti-piracy patrols. He was on a patrol when Amethyst arrived in the colony. The next day he went on board to ‘have a look round and see what I had left’. He was surprised to find most of his kit still there. ‘I had a suitcase with some personal pieces. The kit in the lockers was no good, it had mildew. But everything basically was as I had left it. I was lucky. The only thing that was missing was a hammock, and they had used the hammocks to shore up the holes in the side of the ship. But that was no problem. I rejoined the ship’s company, and then it was a case of getting the ship ready to sail home.’10 Rumours spread that the Chinese Communists were so angry at Amethyst’s escape that they planned to sabotage the ship in Hong Kong. Extra sentries were posted and she was kept floodlit at night.

  Before the escape there had been mounting pressure for the Admiralty to be more open about the ship’s plight. Newspapers were aware of a considerable public demand for information. It was the job of the Chief of Naval Information, Captain Arthur Clarke, to try to block stories. He admitted: ‘Again and again a personal appeal by myself or members of my staff had achieved the suppression of undesirable publicity in accordance with Admiralty policy.’ But by mid-July Clarke had come to the conclusion that this censorship could not be continued for much longer. From Shanghai there was an increasing flow of stories from agency reporters and special correspondents. He warned: ‘I think we may be in danger of one or more newspapers possibly taking the bit between the teeth. I suggest the Admiralty may also be in danger of searching questions in the House; conceivably initiated in consequence of next of kin complaints. I appreciate that the policy of “saying nothing” must have been given the most careful consideration. I only submit that a good deal of time has passed since the ship first got stuck in the river, and that a revision of policy may be even overdue.’11

  Clarke’s argument was shrugged off, his superiors noting that he worked for the Admiralty, not the media. Policy would be followed. Fortunately the escape gave him the opportunity to repay favours. He rose to the occasion, as one executive at the Press Association, the national news agency, gratefully acknowledged. Clarke’s staff had weighed in with ‘loads’ of information. The executive noted: ‘I have been particularly struck by the speed with which your department handled a first-class narrative …’12

  On 31 July Brind, on board Belfast, had written a personal letter to the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser. Brind’s private thoughts appeared to be at odds with his public statements. When Amethyst was safely out of the Yangtze, the admiral sent the message: ‘Your bearing in adversity and your daring passage tonight will be epic in the history of the navy.’ However, he told Fraser: ‘I had felt that a “break away” was definitely a practical operation, with nothing like so serious risks as would seem at first sight. Chinese field guns are not particularly well equipped for accurate shooting at night even at short range … The navigation, though difficult, was not by any means impracticable at night, particularly with a good sounding machine. Furthermore we knew that the Communists were moving ships at night for fear of air attack, so it seemed fairly certain the buoys were alight.’

  Brind had serious doubts about Amethyst’s captain: ‘At one stage I was convinced that Kerans was very nearly exhausted and near throwing in the sponge – and I do not blame him for he had an intolerable time.’ The admiral explained about the lack of a secure code and the confusion over typhoon warnings and possible escape: ‘He [Kerans] asked what seemed exceedingly stupid and unseamanlike questions about typhoons, and I felt that he must either be no sailor at all or that there must be something behind it.’ Brind and Kerans were baffling each other. The admiral added: ‘Kerans, in his endeavour to deceive Kang that he was far too frightened to think of breaking out, deceived me also into seriously doubting whether he [Kerans] had
the stamina left for the job. Also my care not to blow the gaff deceived him into thinking that I did not contemplate a break away and was only considering fighting it out on the negotiation line!’ Brind said he was very glad that the First Sea Lord’s signal to stop Amethyst arrived ‘just too late’.

  The letter took some time to reach Fraser, and the First Sea Lord probably felt embarrassment that he had tried to halt something that was now seen as a triumph for the Royal Navy and Britain. His request also put a question mark over his much-quoted policy – leave it to the man on the spot. In a personal message to Brind, he said: ‘Failure would have involved such complications that I felt I was duty bound to inform the government in advance and that is why I made my signal; I had not appreciated that it was likely to happen so soon otherwise, as you know, I should be the last to tie your hand. You know my motto – “Leave it as far as possible to the man on the spot” – and if there had been a failure we should still have supported you. I was indeed pleased when your signal came saying it was too late but it was an anxious night.’ The insertion of ‘as far as possible’ was a revealing qualification. But he added: ‘I give them all full marks.’

  Fraser also commented on the civil war. The Nationalists were finished, but ‘they were never much good for us’, apart from Admiral Kwei, who could be regarded as a friend. It was important to preserve British interests in China, especially Shanghai, and if the Nationalists were offended ‘they will have to lump it’. Britain’s economic difficulties made world trade even more important.13

  In a local radio broadcast, which was picked up by Radio Malaya, Brind put aside his private thoughts about Kerans and replaced his muted praise for the escape with another tribute to the ship’s company of Amethyst, whose arrival in Hong Kong was ‘a most inspiring sight’. He said: ‘Lieutenant Commander Kerans has been under tremendous strain but he was cheerful and alert, giving great credit to the support of his officers, chief and petty officers and men. As always, not only did the leader inspire his subordinates but he himself was greatly fortified by them, a mutual effect which is not generally appreciated. The men looked very well and took all they had done as a matter of course. It was heartening to meet them and to hear how each one seemed to pass off credit to someone else on some pretext or other.’

  The admiral referred to the circumstances of Amethyst’s captivity. She had every right to be on the Yangtze. The ship was sailing during a ceasefire between the Nationalists and the Communists, and she had the permission of the Chinese government. It was untrue that the frigate attacked PLA positions to help the Nationalists. Consort, London and Black Swan were involved in a ‘humane mission’ to provide medical supplies and to guide Amethyst back down river. ‘There was never any intention to undertake an operation of war, their guns were fore and aft and they flew white flags,’ said Brind. During her captivity Amethyst was under constant threat of destruction, and safe conduct was conditional ‘on admission by me that the British were entirely to blame for the incident of 20 April’. This, of course, he could not possibly accept. Outlining the ship’s escape, he pointed out that she came under heavy fire twice but replied with machine guns and only one round from one of her main guns. ‘The Yangtze incident has now ended, and our thoughts are in the first place for the killed and wounded of all ships involved in the initial phase. The bearing and courage of the wounded, the sustained fortitude of those in the Amethyst and her gallant escape will long inspire the navy.’14

  Brind’s remarks went down well with the Foreign Office, which thought they struck ‘just the right note’. But officials were keen to draw a line under the issue. Trade was the overriding factor. In a message to Ambassador Stevenson in Nanking, they pointed out: ‘We feel strongly that we have a great deal to lose and nothing to gain by keeping this issue alive and we very much hope that from now on no new publicity will be initiated from our side. Amethyst is out but we still have a large stake in China. Our chances of eventually reaching some sort of recognition with the Chinese Communists are slender enough as it is and we do not want to jeopardise them further by embarking on a prolonged propaganda war if it can be possibly avoided.’15

  But the Chinese were waging a propaganda war over Amethyst and specifically the destruction of the merchant ship Kaing Ling Liberation. General Yuan, the senior figure in the negotiations to try to free Amethyst and now no doubt seething with embarrassment, accused the frigate of opening fire on the ship, with the result that she caught fire and sank. Amethyst ploughed through passengers in the water ‘calling for help’ and fired on junks trying to rescue them, and ‘the majority of several hundred passengers were drowned’. Many junks were also sunk. Amethyst carried on, taking advantage of rescue efforts by soldiers. The general accused Admiral Brind of insincerity over the negotiations. The PLA had shown a lenient policy towards the frigate’s ‘criminals’, allowing them to receive letters, supplies and oil.

  Yuan declared:

  So the peoples of China and the whole world can see how imperialists committed misdeeds in reply to benevolence. Those on board the Amethyst made good their disgraceful flight at the expense of the sinking of the Kaing Ling Liberation and many junks and the murder of several hundred of our innocent brethren.

  I am deeply convinced that all rank and file of the People’s Liberation Army and all our brethren shall always remember to revenge the death of the victims and shall never forget or pardon the two barbarous acts committed by the British warship Amethyst. They shall never forget or pardon the British warships London, Consort and Black Swan, which abetted in the crime, nor the swindle of the British admiral Brind.

  The general also complained that the British government was ‘insolently’ celebrating the escape. The New China News Agency called on the Chinese people to avenge the deaths of their compatriots on 20 April and 30 July.16

  One Peking commentary stated: ‘The whole proceedings of the Amethyst incident have deeply convinced the Chinese that imperialists, no matter their nationality, are so ruthless, hypocritical and disgraceful … The fact is so clear that it was a British warship which intruded into a Chinese river and shelled Chinese troops. It is not a case in which Chinese troops intruded into the Thames and shelled a British warship.’ Leading political figures in Peking also stepped forward to ‘condemn the disgraceful act of British imperialism’. Shen Chun-ju, of the Democratic League, declared: ‘The outrageous action of the Amethyst in sinking our merchantman and drowning our people while escaping in a hurry must especially be punished.’ Kuo Mo-jo, described as a nonpartisan democratic personage, said: ‘This was a purely ruthless pirate act. The chieftains in the British imperialist piracy should delay their elation. We will certainly revenge the death of the passengers of the Kaing Ling Liberation.’

  Local papers in Shanghai carried an article that said: ‘After this incident [the sinking of the Kaing Ling Liberation] the prime minister, Attlee, and King George even sent their congratulations to the members of the sloop for their atrocious acts. The official report by the British foreign ministry and the British navy on the 31st was untrue.’ The official report referred to was a joint press release from the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, giving a straightforward outline of Amethyst’s captivity and escape. The British consul in Shanghai, Robert Urquhart, was worried that the inflammatory remarks might lead to organised violence. But survivors of the Kaing Ling Liberation had arrived in the city and were not concealing the fact that they were fired on from the shore. ‘Nevertheless the mob and predatory labour are on call to make trouble irrespective of any rights or wrongs,’ the consul warned. There were foreigners in the city who urgently wanted to leave ‘and the sense of strain is increasing’.17 Nationalist warships were blockading Shanghai, severely restricting shipping.

  The Communist version of the destruction of the Kaing Ling Liberation was, of course, nonsense. Survivors and next of kin were mobbing the Shanghai offices of the vessel’s shipping line and claiming damages, ‘brushing aside newspaper reports of
British responsibility and saying that they know perfectly well the ship was fired on from shore’.18 In his radio broadcast, Admiral Brind stressed that Amethyst had not fired at the merchant ship, and the Communist reports were ‘quite untrue in all respects’. Brind repeated that the frigate fired only one round from the 4in gun she was using and that it was seen to hit the shore near one of the batteries. ‘Those on board our ship say they clearly saw that the shore batteries were firing at one of their own ships and had set her on fire. These batteries continued their firing for about a quarter of an hour after all firing at the British ship had ceased. No more rounds were fired from the Amethyst’s 4in gun throughout the night because her captain decided not to reveal his ship in any way.’ The Admiralty also issued an official denial. In Hong Kong, the government warned the New China News Agency that its reports claiming Amethyst sank the Kaing Ling Liberation were libellous, seditious and overstepping the limits of public security. The agency’s director was warned that in the event of any further infringement ‘appropriate steps would be taken against the organisation’.19